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## THE RELATION OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY TO JEWISH ALEXANDRIAN THOUGHT

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1. The thirty-two years of our Lord's life fall just in the middle of the much longer life of his only conspicuous Jewish contemporary, Philo, who was probably twenty years old at the birth of Jesus, and who went on an embassy to Rome in his old age twenty years after the crucifixion. Neither had the slightest connection with the other. The Alexandrian philosopher betrays no knowledge of the Prophet of Galilee, and certainly Jesus Christ makes no reference to Philo, whose name and fame could scarcely have reached the peasants of Syria. But when Christianity began to spread over the larger world and came into contact with Greek culture, it could not have been long before it was confronted with the vigorous intellectual movement at the Mediterranean port; for both were missionary in spirit, both aimed at universal acceptance. Philo's work was then done, and Philo had no successor of any influence; so that there was no room for Christianity to affect Alexandrian Judaism. The new gospel came too late. Had it appeared fifty years earlier, its influence on so omnivorous a student and so eclectic a thinker as Philo must have been very marked, so that the Jew philosopher might have become an Origen before Origen. But this was not to be. On the other side, however, the case was different. It is quite evident that in course of time Christianity came to be affected by Alexandrian Judaism. In Clement and Origen we see that it has almost entirely absorbed the earlier movement, reproducing the Jewish philosophy in terms of Christian theology. But how early this influence began to be felt, what primitive Christian teachers were affected by it, and how far the New Testament shows traces of its presence, are questions that have met with very different answers. In its widest relations, Alexandrian Judaism may be said in some degree to have left its mark on the whole of the New Testament,

since all the New Testament writers used the Septuagint, which was a translation of the Jewish Scriptures made in the atmosphere of Alexandria. How far the New Testament was affected by the Greek of this version, in distinction from the primitive Hebrew, and what would have been the difference in the New Testament if its writers had known only the Hebrew original and the Targums, is a question which has not yet been fully worked out. The mere citation of texts in which the Greek rendering, even when inaccurate, is followed, does not carry us very far; for this does not enter deeply into the structure of the thought. Moreover, both Paul and John occasionally correct the faulty Greek of the Septuagint by reference to the original Hebrew. But the use of one Alexandrian book by New Testament writers is very marked. There can be no doubt that more than one of the authors of New Testament books were acquainted with and affected by the book of Wisdom.

Now this book is one of the precursors and makers of Philo. It carries forward the *Chochmah* (Wisdom) doctrine that had already appeared in Proverbs, and that was enlarged in the Palestinian work, Ecclesiasticus, personifying wisdom in a more imaginative way and widening the scope of its influence. There can be no question that this book was known to primitive Christian writers. Still it was essentially Jewish, and not really out of touch with Old Testament ways. The case is entirely different with Philo. In making Moses teach Platonic, Stoic, and Pythagorean ideas, Philo uses the law as a parable of Greek philosophy. He is a true Jew in his faith in God and his acceptance of the verbal inspiration of *his people's Scriptures*. But in his efforts to commend those Scriptures to the cultured outside world, when he does not deny, he often ignores their genuine meaning, reading into them doctrines that do not come from Judaism at all, but are wholly of pagan origin. Therefore the case of the influence of Philo on the early Christians is entirely different from that of the influence of the book of Wisdom. The former really means simply the influence of Greek philosophy, although this is made to commend itself by appearing under the guise of biblical history. Here we come to the parting of the ways. The Cambridge school, represented in this matter to some extent even by Westcott, more by Lightfoot, but most of all by Hort, mini-

mizes the Greek influence. Pfeiderer, on the other hand, accounts for the liberalizing movement of Paul by attributing it to Hellenistic influences, and the advanced form of the later Paulinism entirely to the invasion of Greek thought. Harnack postpones this Greek influence on Christianity to a later date, while, in agreement with Hatch, he attaches paramount importance to it in the development of ecclesiastical theology.

We must discriminate. In endeavoring to discover traces of the Alexandrian Hellenic spirit on early Christian teaching, we have to arrange that teaching according to a graduated scale. Then we discover that this arrangement coincides in the main with the chronological order. The teachings of Jesus Christ are farthest removed from the Alexandrian standpoint; next come the earlier Pauline epistles; the later Pauline epistles manifest more resemblance to contemporary Hellenic teaching; and Hebrews and the Johannine writings bear most witness to this influence. To put it another way, there is no relation between Jesus and Philo; if we attempt a parallel, we are continually confronted with differences and contrasts. In the case of Paul there are marked resemblances, together with striking divergences; little or no evidence of literary dependence, but plain proofs of atmospheric infection. With Hebrews we have indubitable dependence on Alexandrian teaching both in idea and in literary form; and in John, strong probability that this is the case.

Little good can come of attempting the unequal comparison between Jesus and Philo. Our Lord propounded no system of philosophy; the Alexandrian lecturer did not propose to redeem the world. Still, both taught that deliverance from evil and the attainment of the only life worth living must be on religious and ethical lines. Both saw that old-fashioned Judaism could not serve for the new age. But here they chose different paths. Philo put new wine into the old bottles. Yet the bottles did not burst, because the wine was not new in itself, but only new to them (*καινός*, not *νέος*). In itself it was stale enough, for Philo was not an original thinker. His system was made up of materials borrowed from philosophers of earlier ages. The only novelty of consequence was the fresh combination of them under the forms of the Jewish Scriptures. For those Scriptures he cherished the deepest reverence,

even when manipulating them freely to suit his own purposes. He held the most rigorous doctrine of inspiration. His freedom was not the critic's license, but only the interpreter's liberty. But Jesus fearlessly rejected the very words of Scripture, even precepts of the sacred Torah, when they were in conflict with what he perceived to be truth, exclaiming: "They of old said" this and that; "but I say unto you"—the very opposite. Then, while Philo only echoed utterances of the spirit of his time, Jesus went counter to prevalent notions in daring originality. With all his novelty of interpretation, Philo gravely claimed to be conservative. He was a reconciler, a remover of difficulties, an answerer of objections—timid, cautious, apologetic, conciliatory. There was nothing in his method of teaching to lead to crucifixion. Jesus saw clearly that no reconciliation of the old with the new was possible. There must be a revolution. He had come to send a sword. He knew that he himself must be the first to be pierced.

Philo conciliates philosophy by banishing anthropomorphism from Jewish theism; and the result is a God without qualities, nameless because a name implies description; although he is not consistent in this, since he writes of God being merciful, as even consisting in goodness itself, the Platonic doctrine. By his denial of name or qualities to God, he wishes to exclude all limitations. Because God is the Infinite he must be the Absolute. In all this there is no approach to that dominant note in our Lord's teaching, the glowing conception of the fatherhood of God. And while to Philo, even more than to the Palestinian Jews, God is remote, only condescending to reach out to the world through intermediate agencies—angels, powers, *λόγοι*—Jesus brings the idea of God down from the heavens, telling how he observes the fall of a sparrow and cares for the smallest things in his children's lives.

Not less remarkable is the difference in moral ideals and methods. While it is a mistake to regard Philo as ascetic, the whole trend of his teaching is in the direction of mastering and suppressing the body in the interest of the free development of the spirit. It would be startling, if it were not so very familiar to us, to see how little Jesus has to say on this theme, which has been the central topic of nearly all teaching of morals. His disregard of fasting and of other

rigorous practices amounted to a scandal in the eyes of the strict. And yet nobody can associate his teaching with the naturalistic optimism of Walt Whitman. We feel, when we approach it, that it absolutely excludes the least laxity in sinful indulgence of the flesh. The explanation of this paradox is that Jesus abandoned asceticism by going farther than the ascetics. This method represses the lower nature in the interest of the higher. It appeals to a refined selfishness, which is not the less selfish because disguised by refinement. But Jesus calls his disciples to the suppression of self all around; not merely the denial of the body for the good of the soul, but the denial of self whether manifested in the senses or in higher regions. Philo, though not actually an ascetic, agrees with the ascetics in making the aim of ethics to consist in self-culture. His whole system is self-centered. Jesus shifts the center. His ethics are essentially unselfish, not sternly altruistic, but rooted in love. Further, they are positive, not negations of evil so much as efforts after good, that good being the welfare of our neighbors.

Lastly in this connection, Philo has no conception of redemption. The kingdom of God, the Messiah, the life given as a ransom, the peace and victory that come by means of personal adhesion to the personal Christ, in which the gospel mainly consists, are all conceptions lying outside the range of Philo's teaching. In the Alexandrian philosophy the equivalent of redemption is self-attained by the effort of the soul in first mastering the body and then rising to ecstasy in reaching up to God. Essentially mystical, intensely emotional, like the ethics the religion is self-centered. In the ethics self is the goal; in the religion self is the starting-point. By its own unaided efforts the soul attains its elysium.

In all these matters, then, we can discover few points of contact between the work and teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ and Philo's philosophy.

2. When we come to Paul, we seem to be entering another atmosphere. The rabbinism of the apostle has no connection with Philo; this must be traced back to Gamaliel or the schools of Tarsus. The doctrine of justification by faith, which is rabbinical in form, though Christian in essence—the forgiveness brought and taught by Jesus Christ stated in terms of the Jewish law courts—is altogether foreign

to the Alexandrian philosophy. But it is otherwise with the apostle's mysticism. Paul was a lawyer and logician by education; but he was a mystic by nature. The exigencies of controversy forced him into the forensic style; when he is left to himself, it falls off; its stiff phrases disappear, and the language becomes personal, realistic, spiritual, mystical. Galatians, the first section of Romans (chaps. 1-6), and the third (chaps. 9-11), 1 Corinthians, and the second part (chaps. 10-12) of 2 Corinthians, give us Paul, the keen controversialist. But the central part of Romans (chaps. 8, 9), the first part of 2 Corinthians (chaps. 1-9), and the epistles of the captivity reveal the abiding ideas of the apostle, those on which he delighted to ruminate in the leisure of his private meditations; and here we find Paul the mystic. The remarkable thing is that here, too, he seems to approach Philo. The genesis of the apostle's personal religion is revealed in Romans, chap. 7, as springing out of a desperate struggle with the flesh. Dramatically recalling the agonies of his pre-Christian life, he exclaims: "But I am *carnal*, sold under sin" (vs. 14). "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the *body* of this death?" (vs. 24). "So then I myself with the mind serve the law of God, but with the *flesh* the law of sin" (vs. 25). Similarly in 1 Corinthians evil generally is called *carnal*. As far as I am aware, this is a new doctrine in the Bible. We find it nowhere in the teachings of Jesus, nor is it to be discovered in the Old Testament, where the term "flesh" is a common Hebraism for mankind, especially as regards the frailty of the race. God will pour out his Spirit "upon all *flesh*;" that is, simply upon all mankind; "all *flesh* is grass;" that is, the whole human race is frail and fleeting. There is no indication of moral evil in these passages, nor is there in any other of the Old Testament references to "flesh." If, then, Paul did not derive the idea from his early education in the Scriptures, nor from his new Master, how came it to appear in his writings? He learned it in the hard school of experience, we are told. It is a result of introspection, of the pathological study of his own life-story. Now, there is truth in this assertion, as Romans, chap. 7, plainly shows. The apostle had felt the dragging of the body toward evil which he there so vividly described. If his teaching had no antecedents in adjacent regions of thought, we should be compelled to

rest satisfied with this conclusion, holding that there was an entirely original thought sprung on the world by the great apostle. But it has antecedents. It is a dominant idea of Philo; it is in the very atmosphere of Greek ethics. Though so different in form, Paul's confessions in Romans, chap. 7, might be an echo of the teachings of Socrates in the *Phædrus*. According to Pfeleiderer and Holsten, its origin is Greek. Did it reach Paul from Greece through Alexandrian Judaism—the most sympathetic medium through which a Jew could receive Greek ideas? Before we can answer this question, we must examine the position more exactly. Then we shall see that Paul's doctrine of the flesh differs considerably from Philo's doctrine of matter. The very terms are different, and their difference is significant. The word "flesh" is Hebraic in its usage, conceived practically, used popularly, bearing on moral conduct; but "matter" is thoroughly Greek, and it is regarded metaphysically, rather as a term of speculative philosophy than as belonging to practical ethics. "Matter" is the primary element, existing before creation, and utilized in creation when the ideas of the Logos, become "powers" in action, impress themselves upon it. To call this eternally self-existing element "matter," although we have no better name for it, is misleading; for matter, in our sense of the word, it is not. We must not think of it as having outline of boundaries, as being ponderable, or as offering resistance to motion; indeed, as being anything for the senses to perceive; for it has no qualities, and only by its qualities can a thing be perceived or described. Rather, then, it is an eternal potentiality. Nevertheless, it is a limiting potentiality. Owing to this fact, creation, which is the endowing of it with qualities, the impressing on it of the orderly arrangement determined by the Architect's plan, is limited. This limitation is what we call "evil." Philo regards evil as essentially negative, we might say non-existent, or rather say that it is a certain non-existence. It is a void where, if all were good, we should have a *plenum*. It is the coming short of the infinite, perfect design, owing to the intractability of matter.

We meet with nothing of this in Paul. He does not discuss the nature of evil in the abstract, or its manifestation in the universe at large. Whenever he deals with the subject he is wholly concerned with personal evil, sin. Then, although he closely associates this



with the flesh, he never treats the two things as identical. On the one hand, he does not confine the term "flesh" to the material of the animal organism. The factiousness of the Corinthians is "carnal;" anything that gives the supremacy to the sensuous, the external, is "carnal." Among "the works of the flesh" he has "idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wrath, factions, divisions, heresies, envyings" (Gal. 5:21). On the other hand, the flesh is identified with the body as a whole, as fully organized, not merely with the substance of which it consists. Thus the body becomes the seat of sin. When the apostle refers to "sinful flesh," the attribute is synthetic, not analytic; the word "sinful" is not descriptive of something in the essential nature of flesh; it indicates something attached to flesh as we know it.

That this is so will be apparent when we consider some of Paul's references to the body, which, as we have seen, the apostle mentions as freely as the flesh when he is referring to the seat of sin. Though this flesh, this body, is associated with sin, it is not so by nature, because it need not be so always. The Christian's body is a temple of the Holy Ghost; he is to make a living sacrifice of it, holy and acceptable to God, by an intelligent and spiritual use of it—a "reasonable" service (Rom. 12:1). This, then, is by no means Philo's doctrine simply carried over into Christianity. The two differ materially both in phrase and in idea. And yet there is one common characteristic which remains in spite of these differences. With both the bodily part of our nature is in some way that in which evil resides, from which it springs, or with which it is peculiarly connected. One might say that knowledge of the world and experience of life would teach this lesson quickly enough without the aid of philosophy. Still, since it does not appear in the Old Testament, but is found both in Paul and in Philo, is it not reasonable to surmise that, after all, there was some connection between the two great Jewish teachers, though this may have been indirect, and not even perceived at the time? It would seem that the atmosphere of the age, at all events in the Greek-speaking Jewish world, was colored with ideas derived from Philo, and that Paul assimilated that atmosphere so far as it coincided with his readings of experience and agreed with his views of life.

In another region some association between Paul's teaching and ideas of Philo may be suspected, since undoubtedly there is a resemblance, amounting even to verbal agreement. We owe to the great apostle the formation of primitive Christology. I do not forget that there are expressions ascribed to our Lord himself by the synoptic evangelists which cannot be accounted for except on the hypothesis of his consciousness of his Divine nature, in some of which he speaks of himself as in a unique sense the Son of God. But evidently these mysterious utterances were not assimilated previous to Paul's teachings on the subject. To Paul we owe the first explicit preaching of Jesus as the Son of God. It is significant that the apostle describes his vocation as the realizing of God's purpose to "reveal his Son" in him, that is to say, to use the apostle as the medium for the revelation of his Son (Gal. 1:16). In Acts also Paul's first preaching is thus described: "And straightway in the synagogues he proclaimed Jesus that he is the *Son of God*" (Acts 9:20). It is a note of the historicity of Acts that none of the earlier preachers—Peter, Philip, Stephen—uses that designation. Peter's speeches are obscured by the inaccuracy of the Authorized Version. He is not said, as it there appears, to have preached of Jesus as God's "Son," but as God's "Servant" (not *viós*, but *παῖς*), apparently in allusion to "The Servant of the Lord" in the Deutero-Isaiah; and then *exalted* to be a Prince and a Savior. It is Paul who first declares the divine sonship.

The apostle's Christology advances with his later teaching. There we have pre-existence, a heavenly rule, even association with the creation and administration of the universe. The climax is reached in Colossians, where Christ is described, not merely as the medium of creation and the instrument of providence, but even as the end, the goal toward which all things are working, or the person they are destined to serve. "All things have been created through him and *unto* him" (Col. 1:16). Earlier than this he appears as the "image (*εἰκόν*) of God" (2 Cor. 4:4); here he is "the image of the invisible God," and the "firstborn of all creation" (vs. 15). How did Paul come to these ideas and phrases, absolutely without parallel in primitive apostolic teaching? We may say that contemplation on the greatness of Christ experienced in his effective, redeeming grace led the apostle on under the influence of the spiritual light he claimed to

receive from God, so that he concluded that the Savior, whose triumph in the resurrection had led to such great results, must have this exalted nature, must have been pre-existent, must have been endowed with the vast functions here ascribed to him. The apostle may have inferred that they were involved in the divine sonship, which not merely the fact of the resurrection, but its potency, the grace flowing from it, appeared to demonstrate. But was all this reached solely in the private meditations of his own mind, without the aid of a single impulse from any other thinker? That is contrary to all experience in the history of thought.

Now, when we turn to Philo, we come upon some remarkable parallels. We discover that the Son of God in Paul occupies a very similar place in the universe to Philo's Logos, the pre-existent medium of creation and present instrument of Providence and Revelation. The Logos is in a sense God's Son. He is the "firstborn." It is true, the Greek terms differ. Paul has *πρωτοτόκος*, i. e., first-conceived and born, while Philo has *πρωτογόνος*, literally "first-begotten;" but the essential ideas are identical, and Philo's expression is the more neatly accurate in view of a divine fatherhood, although, as we have seen, he never works out that idea. Then the Logos is the "image" (*εἰκὼν*) of God—the very same word used by Paul. It is significant to observe in this connection that the apostle here employs an unusual expression, saying "the *invisible* God." Invisibility is an idea especially congenial to Philo's conception of the Divine Being. Can we say that all these coincidences are purely accidental? There are great differences between the Christian apostle and the Jewish philosopher. With Paul the Son of God is always a person; but Philo's Logos, though personified in his highly allegorical way, is not really a distinct person, but either the divine reason, or God's plan of the universe, or the power he puts forth in realizing this plan. I say this in spite of Mr. Conybeare's statements to the contrary, but with Dr. Drummond. Then Philo would never dream of identifying the Logos with the Messiah. On the other hand, Paul never uses the term "Logos" for the Son of God. It is the most characteristic word in Philo's system. If Paul knew Philo and borrowed ideas and phrases from him, he must have deliberately rejected the dominant idea and favorite term of the Jewish Alexandrian phil-

osophy. Here again the more likely explanation appears to be that the influence of Philo was felt by Paul through the medium of the atmosphere created by the Alexandrian Jew, which had spread so widely as to have penetrated the circles within which the apostle moved in his later days, so that even characteristic phrases hid in this way had reached him.

3. In the third stage of proximity to the Jewish Alexandrian school we have the epistle to the Hebrews and the fourth gospel. With regard to both of these works it is not difficult to discover, not only resemblances, but also definite marks of dependence. The epistle to the Hebrews is admittedly a work richly imbued with Alexandrianism. This fact has to be taken into account in any discussion of the perplexing problem of its authorship. It is the chief ground on which many assign it to Apollos—because we know that Apollos was a Jew from Alexandria. The author knows the Old Testament only in the Septuagint; in several places he betrays his acquaintance with the book of Wisdom; it is scarcely less evident that he was familiar with the teachings of Philo. A convincing evidence of this latter fact may be seen in the formulæ with which he introduces quotations from the Old Testament. These are unique in the New Testament. Paul and every other apostolic writer, except the author of Hebrews, quote the several authors by name, or use some general designation. They either name the human author or refer their quotations in general terms to “the Scriptures,” “the Law.” They introduce the technical phrase “it is written.” Thus we have: “He saith also in Hosea” (Rom. 9:25); “Isaiah saith” (vs. 27); “It is written” (vs. 33); “Moses saith” (10:19). This style is never met with in Hebrews. The author takes the highest view of the inspiration of Scripture. The human writer is left out of account; it is simply the word of God. Thus quotations are introduced with such phrases as “He saith” (Heb. 1:7; 4:1; 5:6; 8:8; 10:4, etc.); “the Holy Ghost saith” (3:7); “it is said” (3:15); “it is witnessed” (7:17); “the exhortation which reasoneth with you” (12:5), as though the Scriptures were personified. On no single occasion, among all these many Scripture references of this epistle, is any human author named. In one case alone the human author is referred to; and there it is with a vague

periphrasis, as though it were purposely designed to keep him in the background. We read here: "But one hath somewhere testified" (2:6).

These peculiarities in the introductions of Old Testament quotations are all found in Philo. This is exactly Philo's method, and, indeed, we have here the very words he employs. Therefore the least we must infer is that the author of Hebrews belonged to the same literary circle as Philo. But should we not venture farther and conclude that he must have been a disciple of the Alexandrian philosopher, if not in person, at any rate by the perusal of his written works? This conclusion seems to be confirmed by further resemblances. The treatment of the law as the shadow of higher truth, and the depreciation of the material element in it compared with the ideal, are Philonic. In particular, a notable feature of the epistle is the prominence given to Melchizedek regarded mystically. In Philo also Melchizedek appears as an important mystical personage. Then we have specific phrases, found nowhere else in the New Testament, but to be discovered in the Jewish Alexandrian writings. The remarkable word rendered by our Revisers "effulgence" (Heb. 1:3) is found both in the book of Wisdom (7:25) and in Philo (*De Concupisc.*, 11; *De Opif. Mund.*, 5; *De Plantatione Noae*, 2), and that other peculiar term rendered "the very image" (Heb. 1:3) is found in Philo (*De Plantatione Noae*, 5). Moreover, the application of these peculiar terms is similar in both cases; in the New Testament book they are applied to the Son of God, and in Wisdom and the Alexandrian writers to wisdom and the Logos.

While, however, dependence seems to be proved, there are marked differences even here. In Hebrews, as much as in the other New Testament books, we have Jesus Christ, the real, living, personal Son of God, and not an allegorical abstraction, such as wisdom or the Logos, as the medium of divine revelation and action. Then, while Philo would still retain the forms of Judaism, the author of Hebrews would abolish those forms, and substitute for them, not metaphysical ideas or ethical principles after the Alexandrian method, but the actual person and work of Christ; so that the counterpart to the Jewish sacrifices is not some ideal conception, but the very real sacrifice of Jesus Christ, presenting to God his blood, that is, the fruit of his

actual death on the cross, a concrete historical event. Moreover, the way of salvation is through this sacrifice and the personal intercession of Christ as our high-priest, while with Philo it consisted only in moral culture and the striving of the soul to attain to ecstasy. The essential elements of Hebrews cannot be traced back to the Alexandrian school. Philo may account for its form; its substance represents independent, original Christianity.

4. Lastly, we have the fourth gospel. The association of this work with Philo is almost, if not entirely, confined to the prologue. The Logos doctrine, which is so prominent on the opening page, never appears in the course of the narrative. But it is difficult to resist the conclusion that we have in this prologue a case of real derivation from Philo. First, and above all, there is the very use of the word "Logos." It is true that this might have appeared simply as a translation of the Hebrew word *Memra*, the "word of the Lord" in the Old Testament and rabbinical literature, since, indeed, it is so used in the Septuagint. That is conceivable. But is it probable? Observe how abruptly it is introduced by the evangelist. He takes for granted, that the term is familiar to his readers. How comes he to do so? In no earlier writings is the pre-existent Christ thus identified with the "word of God." Moreover, if he means only this, why does not John avoid all possible ambiguity by being more explicit? Why does he not use the full scriptural phrase, "The word of Yahweh?" The term "Logos" must have been widely spread abroad, not only among Jews affected by Philo, but more directly under the influence of the Stoics, from whom Philo had derived it. Unless the author of the fourth gospel was ignorant of the Stoic as well as the Philonic use of the term, he must have known that his adoption of it in an absolute form would lead to associations with the prevalent usage. Why, then, did he not guard against the mistake, if mistake it was? The only answer on this hypothesis is that he did not know that he was creating a serious ambiguity. But there is much more than the abrupt introduction of this word into Christian literature to send us to Philo for its source. The description of the status and functions of the Logos shows marked resemblance to the Alexandrian thinker. He is called "God," and Philo's Logos is "the second God" (in one place, *Fragments*, ii, 265). He is in intimate

association with God, is the instrument of creation and the medium of revelation. All this we find in Philo. Can it all be no more than an accidental series of coincidences? Surely, the probability leans heavily the other way. The prologue of John is redolent of Philo, rich in echoes of the ripest Alexandrian philosophy. Yet even here, as in all the New Testament writings previously referred to, the author preserves his individuality and his conviction of specific truths essential to Christianity which are alien to Philo and even repugnant to his system. In particular, there are four, viz.: (1) the sense of *word* attached to the term "Logos," rather than that of *reason*; (2) the personality of the Logos; (3) his incarnation; (4) his identification when incarnate with the Jewish Messiah. With Philo the Logos is reason; though allegorically personified, it is not an actual person; the incarnation would be utterly opposed to Philo's ideas of liberation and detachment from the material; Philo felt no interest in the popular notion of the Messiahship. Such important differences reveal considerable independence. Thus even in the prelude to John, the most Philonic passage of the New Testament, the full teaching goes far beyond Philo, and its departure from the Alexandrian philosophy is all in the direction of the specific Christian truth that is common to the New Testament writers.

The conclusion to which we seem to be brought is, on the one hand, that there are distinct traces of Alexandrian influences in the New Testament, not, indeed, in the teachings of Jesus Christ, but indirectly affecting Paul, and more directly the authors of Hebrews and the fourth gospel; but, on the other hand, that the more essential teachings of the New Testament are not due to this source, and that even where its influence is most felt it does not destroy those essential characteristics or distort the ideas of original Christianity, while it is of some aid in developing those ideas